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A Supervisory Board functions as a core internal control mechanism, helping enterprises detect asset diversion, related-party transactions, financial irregularities, and management overreach before they escalate into shareholder conflicts. Its effectiveness depends on clear provisions in the Corporate Charter, independent appointment criteria, defined reporting duties, and genuine access to company records rather than symbolic establishment. Under the Law on Enterprises and Businesses, enterprises should align the Supervisory Board’s authority with the right to examine accounting books, financial statements, contracts, and transactions involving related persons.
Long Phan Consulting supports companies in structuring governance rules, review procedures, and oversight systems that strengthen accountability and reduce operational risk.

Key legal notes:
The Supervisory Board is not merely a mechanism for rectifying misconduct after damage has occurred. It functions as an independent oversight body for Enterprise Managers, enabling shareholders and owners to detect financial risks, conflicts of interest, and executive overreach at an early stage.
In essence, a Supervisory Board provides value only when granted the authority to access actual records, data, and transaction logs. If this body exists solely within the Corporate Charter without independent inspection powers, internal risks can accumulate into shareholder disputes or asset depletion.
Self-dealing transactions typically arise when an Enterprise Manager utilizes shell companies, relatives, or associated legal entities to divert benefits away from the company. The Supervisory Board must identify these risks before contracts are signed, payments are executed, or settlements are finalized.
Transactions with Related Persons require stringent scrutiny, as the law classifies Enterprise Managers, Legal Representatives, and Supervisors as related subjects, pursuant to Point d, Clause 23, Article 4 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
When the Supervisory Board is denied the right to review contracts with Related Persons, the mechanism for controlling group interests becomes effectively void. Enterprises should define transaction thresholds requiring mandatory pre-approval within their Corporate Charter and financial regulations.
The Legal Representative holds the authority to sign agreements and manage external transactions; thus, the risk of abuse of power often yields immediate consequences. Common scenarios include the concealment of financial information, signing contracts exceeding their authorized limits, or distributing profits contrary to internal mechanisms.
Upon detecting signs of violation, the Supervisory Board must activate an official handling process in writing. The law requires the Supervisory Board to notify the highest governing body immediately, demand the cessation of violations, and propose solutions to remedy the consequences, pursuant to Clause 8, Article 170 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
This process prevents enterprises from responding emotionally or lacking evidence. For investors, this is a vital layer of protection against the risk of assets being utilized beyond their control.
The Supervisory Board should not merely inspect records after an incident has occurred. A more valuable function is evaluating the company’s internal control system, internal audit, risk management, and early warning mechanisms, pursuant to Clause 4, Article 170 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
If the early warning system is not periodically tested, minor irregularities can evolve into major financial risks. Enterprises should transform the Supervisory Board into an active oversight mechanism, rather than a department that merely confirms incidents after damage is sustained.
The obligation to establish a Supervisory Board is not uniform across all enterprises. Owners, investors, and legal departments must review company types, State ownership ratios, and shareholder structures before designing the oversight apparatus. Applying the wrong model can leave an enterprise without a mandatory supervisory body or maintaining one that is redundant, both of which increase management costs and internal dispute risks.
The Joint Stock Company (JSC) model carries a high risk of dispersed ownership; therefore, the law imposes oversight mechanisms via a Supervisory Board. However, smaller companies may be exempted from this body if they meet specific statutory criteria.
| Case | Obligation to Establish Supervisory Board | Legal Basis |
| Standard JSC | Must organize a Supervisory Board within the governance structure | Point a, Clause 1, Art. 137, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
| Company with < 11 shareholders | May be exempt if conditions regarding institutional shareholders are met | Point a, Clause 1, Art. 137, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
| Institutional shareholders own < 50% total shares | Combined condition to qualify for Supervisory Board exemption | Point a, Clause 1, Art. 137, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
The General Meeting of Shareholders should evaluate real-world risks before deciding against establishing a Supervisory Board. Companies with few shareholders but complex internal transactions should still maintain an independent oversight mechanism.
For Limited Liability Companies, the obligation to establish a Supervisory Board depends on the ownership structure and the presence of State capital. This requires careful verification during restructuring or capital injection from State-affiliated entities.
For family-owned groups or private parent-subsidiary structures, a Supervisory Board is not always mandatory. However, investors should view this as a power-check tool when management authority is concentrated in a single individual.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are subject to stricter control requirements due to their direct connection to the preservation of public capital and assets. The law defines an SOE as an enterprise where the State holds over 50% of charter capital or total voting shares, pursuant to Clause 11, Article 4 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
Enterprises with State capital must simultaneously review their Corporate Charter, financial regulations, and supervisor appointment mechanisms. Failing to establish a mandatory Supervisory Board can undermine the entire internal control system.
The structure of the Supervisory Board must be designed to provide sufficient oversight capacity without creating additional formal layers. The focus should not be solely on the number of Supervisors, but on their independence, expertise, and access to data. For investors, a weak Supervisory Board can distort risk assessments before investing capital or purchasing shares. Therefore, personnel standards need to be checked before the company’s charter or appointment resolution is approved.
Businesses need to determine the correct number of Supervisors based on their company type before designing the supervisory structure. Understaffing or exceeding the legally mandated model can create risks to the effectiveness of internal governance.
| Type of business | Number of Controllers | Term | Legal basis |
| Limited Liability Company | From 01 to 05 Controller | Under 5 years | Clause 1, Article 65 of the Law on Enterprise 2020 |
| Joint Stock Company | From 03 to 05 Controller | Under 5 years | Clause 1, Article 168 of the Law on Enterprise 2020 |
Term 5 years while this helps businesses maintain stability in oversight, the Supervisory Board should not become a long-term dependent position. Businesses need to evaluate performance after each term before re-electing.
Independence is a vital condition for the Supervisory Board. If the Supervisor is a relative, subordinate, or has a vested interest in the business manager, the supervisory mechanism may be effectively neutralized.
Businesses should set independence standards higher than the legal minimum. Company charters could include criteria such as non-remuneration, non-involvement in management, and no cross-interests.
When regulations change personnel standards, businesses don’t necessarily have to replace all their Supervisory Board members immediately. Transitional provisions help prevent abrupt disruptions to the supervisory system.
Transition mechanisms are not a reason to retain personnel lacking independence. If the existing Controller is no longer suitable for the governance risks, the business should prepare a replacement plan early.
A Supervisory Board only generates value when equipped with substantive oversight tools. The right to inspect records, appraise reports, and trigger shareholder meetings is the foundation for preventing information concealment. For shareholders and investors, these rights transform internal control from a passive state to an active one. Enterprises must specify the Supervisory Board’s authority within their Corporate Charter and operational regulations.
Access to documentation is the core condition for the Supervisory Board to detect financial discrepancies. The Supervisory Board has the right to review, search, and extract data from accounting books, financial statements, contracts, transactions, and other company documents, pursuant to Clause 5, Article 170 and Clause 2, Article 171 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
If the Director or accounting department delays providing records, the Supervisory Board must document this as evidence of obstruction. This serves as the basis for reporting to the General Meeting of Shareholders, the Board of Members, or the company owner.
The power to convene meetings as a replacement is a potent tool when the Board of Directors fails to fulfill its obligations during governance crises. This mechanism prevents shareholders from having their decision-making rights locked by intentional delays.
The Supervisory Board possesses oversight powers, but Supervisors also bear responsibility if they neglect their duties or collude in causing damage. Personal liability mechanisms prevent the Supervisory Board from existing merely as a formality without performing its functions.
| Violation | Governance Consequence | Legal Basis |
| Neglect of duty for 06 consecutive months | GMS has the right to remove the Supervisor | Point b, Clause 2, Art. 174, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
| Violation of law causing damage to the company | Subject to personal or joint liability for damages | Clause 5, Art. 173, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
| SOE Supervisor causing damage | Must indemnify and return income/benefits gained from violation | Clause 4, Art. 107, Law on Enterprise 2020 |
Enterprises should clearly define performance evaluation criteria for Supervisors in their operational regulations. When responsibility is quantified, the Supervisory Board is incentivized to fulfill its role in providing warnings and protecting corporate assets.
The Supervisory Board operates effectively only when its powers are translated into clear internal processes. Enterprises must concurrently design their Corporate Charter, Supervisory Board Operational Regulations, financial regulations, and data-provision mechanisms.
In the absence of these procedures, Supervisors may hold the title but remain unable to access accounting books, contracts, or management reports. This is a common cause for the failure of internal control mechanisms.
The Corporate Charter must establish the legal standing of the Supervisory Board, while the operational regulations must specify how these powers are exercised. Enterprises should clearly define the scope of inspection, operational budgets, and the cooperation responsibilities of Enterprise Managers, pursuant to Article 10 of Decree No. 47/2021/NĐ-CP.
Legacy regulations should be reviewed, as Decision No. 35/2013/QĐ-TTg has been abolished, per Point d, Clause 2, Article 34 of Decree No. 47/2021/NĐ-CP. Enterprises failing to update these regulations may create loopholes in financial and internal contract control.
Periodic inspection schedules enable the Supervisory Board to detect discrepancies before data reaches higher authorities. The Supervisory Board is responsible for appraising the truthfulness and legality of financial statements and business performance reports before submitting them to the General Meeting of Shareholders or the owner, pursuant to Clause 3, Article 170 of the Law on Enterprise 2020.
Reporting mechanisms must be sufficiently clear to enable the highest governance level to make timely decisions. If reports are delayed or lack data, financial risks may be concealed across multiple accounting periods.
Infographic on the process of establishing and issuing regulations for the operation of a company’s supervisory board.
Changes to the Head of the Supervisory Board or individual Supervisors are not merely internal personnel matters. For enterprises subject to information disclosure requirements, these events must be handled within statutory deadlines to avoid compliance risks.
Enterprises must disclose irregular information within 36 hours from the decision date regarding the change of the Head of the Supervisory Board or a Supervisor, pursuant to Point d, Clause 1, Article 110 of the Law on Enterprise 2020, as guided by Article 24 of Decree No. 47/2021/NĐ-CP.
The 36-hour deadline requires enterprises to have rapid response procedures ready. Delays in disclosure or incomplete personnel documentation can impair the transparency of the internal control apparatus.
Establishing a Supervisory Board is not merely an administrative personnel procedure; it is a critical strategic imperative for controlling power, financial data, and internal transactions. Long Phan Consulting Company supports enterprises in designing oversight mechanisms tailored to their corporate type, shareholder structure, and operational risk profile.
Our advisory focus is on transforming the Supervisory Board from a formalistic structure into a substantive risk-prevention tool. Our advisory dossier is structured for immediate integration into your Corporate Charter, financial regulations, and internal approval processes.
Legal appraisal assists investors and owners in identifying transactions at risk of self-dealing before damage occurs. The focus is on auditing the relationships between Enterprise Managers, Related Persons, and the contract approval chain.
This appraisal activity is essential when preparing for capital calls, equity transfers, or group restructuring. Our legal reports provide investors with the evidentiary basis to negotiate terms that protect their interests.
The Corporate Charter and Operational Regulations are the foundations for granting substantive oversight powers. If internal documents do not explicitly stipulate the right to access documentation, the Supervisory Board will struggle to verify financial data or sensitive transactions.

When internal risks evolve into disputes, minority shareholders or owners require a strategically represented defense. Long Phan Consulting Company provides support in addressing abuse of power, self-dealing transactions, and breaches of fiduciary duty with clear evidentiary records.
Enterprises, shareholders, or investors may send their Corporate Charter, internal regulations, transaction contracts, and financial statements via Email: info@longphanpmt.com or Zalo: 0906.735.386 for an initial assessment by Long Phan Consulting Company.
Establishing a “Corporate Supervisory Board” is not only a legal obligation but also a crucial safeguard for shareholders to prevent abuse of power and asset loss. Situations involving internal conflicts of interest, misconduct by executives, or issues with supervisory personnel structure always require transparent and precise handling mechanisms. The following solutions address practical challenges in internal control governance.
Joint-stock companies are not required to establish a Supervisory Board if their internal structure has fewer than 11 shareholders and institutional shareholders own less than 50% of the total shares. For other shareholder structures, joint-stock companies are required to establish an operational body with 3 to 5 Supervisors, as stipulated in Point a, Clause 1, Article 137 and Clause 1, Article 168 of the Law on Enterprise 2020. The lack of this supervisory body in mandatory models will lead to the risk of operational suspension.
No, individuals with family ties to business managers or members of the Board of Directors are absolutely prohibited from holding the position of Internal Auditor. This legal standard is established to protect the independence and transparency of internal audit activities, as stipulated in Point c, Clause 1, Article 169 of the Law on Enterprise 2020. Businesses need to conduct thorough background checks on their personnel to prevent illegal self-serving transactions.
Shareholders have the full right to remove ineffective supervisory personnel to streamline the organization. The General Meeting of Shareholders has the authority to decide on the dismissal of the Supervisory Board if that individual fails to fulfill their rights and obligations for six consecutive months, as stipulated in Point c, Clause 2, Article 138 and Point b, Clause 2, Article 174 of the Law on Enterprise 2020. Immediately afterward, the enterprise must disclose the unusual information within 36 hours of the decision to change personnel.
Individuals who abuse their supervisory authority for personal gain will face severe remedial penalties. Supervisors who violate the law and cause damage to the company will be held personally or jointly liable for compensation and repayment of all income obtained from the violation, as stipulated in Clause 4, Article 107 and Clause 5, Article 173 of the Law on Enterprise 2020. Investors can rely on this provision to file lawsuits and recover all lost funds.
Personnel managing internal supervisory bodies are required to meet high-level professional standards. The Head of the Supervisory Board in joint-stock companies and state-owned enterprises must possess a university degree or higher in economics, finance, accounting, auditing, law, or business administration, as stipulated in Point a, Clause 3, Article 103 and Clause 2, Article 168 of the Law on Enterprise 2020. Enterprises that violate this appointment requirement will render their internal audit reports legally invalid.
An effective Supervisory Board in Vietnam must function as a substantive oversight mechanism rather than a mere procedural formality within your Corporate Charter. When Supervisors are empowered with true independence, unhindered access to financial records, and rigorous reporting protocols, enterprises can proactively mitigate risks of executive overreach, self-dealing transactions, and asset misappropriation before they escalate into shareholder disputes. Conversely, a board lacking clear authority or operational autonomy weakens your entire internal control framework, leaving investors vulnerable to undetected fiscal irregularities.
To design, audit, or restructure a robust governance model tailored to your specific ownership profile, contact the expert legal advisory team at Long Phan Consulting Company. Secure your corporate assets today by consulting with our specialists via our hotline at 1900636389.
📚 This article is provided with professional consultation based on the following legal framework:









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